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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted a lot of interest in the research community. The
security mechanism with large overhead of computation and
communication, are infeasible to apply in WSNs due to many
constraints such as limited energy, resource and memory, and
low computation capability. Current access control models cannot
make an effective access decision in many events because access
decisions are based on predefined access policies and roles.
Sometimes, users may need to access important data urgently but
apart from those predefined access policies, other user request
will not be granted. An adaptive access control model is proposed
aiming to provide a flexible and an effective access decision on
user access request at any time. The proposed model is developed
in Ponder2 framework with additional extensions to adapt the
unexpected events by using privilege overriding and also adjust
its decision based on users’ behaviour trust value. A medical
scenario is used as an example application to develop and evaluate
the proposed model in Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) and WSNs.
In this paper, detailed design, implementation phase, evaluation
result and policies testing for the proposed adaptive access control
model are presented. Based on an evaluation result, all the
modules in the proposed access control model are cooperated
to make an effective access decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) technology has been
the interest of researchers and scientists in many research
areas because of their potential to change the way of living
with applications in retail, medicine, emergency management
and many other areas. WSNs consist of hundreds and even
thousand of low-cost small sized sensor nodes each with sens-
ing, processing and communicating capabilities to monitor the
real world environment and collect information through infra-
structureless ad-hoc wireless networks. Nowadays, a sensor
node can capture multimedia data and store data locally as
the distributed manner or transfer it to a central storage as
the centralized manner. WSNs become popular and play an
essential role in the medical or healthcare domain. Wireless
sensor nodes become smaller and more powerful to use in a
wide range of medical applications such as health monitoring,
chronic disease management and measuring user vital signs.
Garci-Morchon and Wehrle [1] mentioned that user’s medical
data lead to security and privacy concern. Therefore, collected
and stored data are important and it should be kept secretly.
Additionally access to that private data needs to protect unau-
thorized access from both legitimate and illegitimate users.
Using security mechanism can provide the security properties
such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, etc. and can
prevent abnormal access from the internal and external users.
This paper focuses on an access control model in WSNs
and Body Sensor Network (BSN). There are many constraints
such as limited memory and power, which impose unique
security challenges and make innovative approaches desirable
in WSNs. A new security mechanism and access control
model are needed because existing security mechanisms are
not efficient, adequate and suitable to use and apply in WSNs.
Towards addressing these challenges, this paper discusses an
adaptive access control model and its implementation result
in Ponder2 framework. The remaining structure of this paper
is explained as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work.
Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed access control
model. In section 4, the development and implementation of
an adaptive access control model are discussed. Section 5
represents an evaluation result based on a medical scenario.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Access control is a critical security service to prevent
unauthorized access of network resources from the users. In
WSNs, users can enter the sensor field directly to access
data at the sensor nodes. Different users may have different
access privileges to access data at the sensor nodes based on
their roles and policies. Most of the access control models
in WSNs and Wireless Medical Sensor Network (WMSN)
are based on traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
which has been widely accepted as a policy access control
model. Cryptography-based access control is designed for the
untrusted environment, where the lack of global knowledge
and control is defining characteristics. Cryptography is relied
upon to control data access and to ensure data confidentiality
and integrity. Cryptography methods in WSNs should meet the
constraints of sensor nodes.
Distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control (PRIC-
CESS) protocol [2] is proposed to provide privacy preserving
distributed access control in WSNs. The PRICCESS model
used Access Control List (ACL) to store the access permission
of the group in the network controller. For ACL, roles need to
be predefined in advance based on RBAC. Garci-Morchon et
al [1] pointed out that RBAC model is not good enough to use
in WSNs because in the traditional RBAC model, the roles and
policies have to be predefined in advance. Based on that point
of view, they proposed the Context-Aware RBAC [1] model
for WMSNs. An access control decision will be based on the
modular contextual information such as normal, emergency
and critical, to ensure the users’ safety. In normal situations,
a user needs to verify his role to access the medical data of a
healthy patient. The user can perform any action and can access
data, when the system declares as critical and emergency
case. One of the disadvantages of this model is, there is no
prevention or detection mechanism and no verification process
to check user’s data access, when the critical situation occurs.
Ferreria et al [3] proposed the Break-the-Glass Role Based
Access Control (BTG-RBAC). The main idea of this model
is to gather necessary information from end users with their
collaboration for usable access control policy that can perform
BTG action in emergency cases. BTG extension is used for
emergency and important cases whenever a user wants to
access data urgently and immediately. When the user tries to
perform BTG actions, the system will ask him if he really want
to perform that action on specific object. If the user answers
affirmatively, the system will activate the BTG operation and
trigger the associated obligations like alarms, log file, etc.
BTG-RBAC model is much more flexible than normal RBAC
but one of the disadvantages is that human processes are
needed in order to enforce the BTG rules.
Yu et al [4] proposed Fine-grained Data Access Control
(FDAC) model which is based on Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) [5]. The main idea of their approach is to provide a fine-
grained access control over sensor data and is resilient against
the attacks such as user colluding and node compromising.
Their model is based on a centralized approach because only
the network controller is managed for key management. If the
network controller is compromised, there will be no security
provisioning in the network. Therefore, a single point of failure
can be occurred. In this approach, CP-ABE based selective
broadcast is used for the user revocation and key revocation
but there is no detailed information on how to use it.
To avoid a single point of failure, Ruj et al [6] pro-
posed an access control scheme based on Multi-authority
Attribute Based Encryption. Their objective is to provide fully
distributed data access control by using several Distribution
Centers (DCs). All the access structures from each DC, which
need to satisfy the attributes from sensor nodes, are ANDed
together to get a complete access for the single user. There
is no detailed explanation of how to combine all the access
structures together. Without the combining approach, the user
has to store all the access structures in order to access different
types of data from the sensor network.
From the above discussion, it is clear that achieving fine-
grained data access control with flexibility is still an open
challenge in WSNs. There is no protection for unauthorized
usage from both legitimate and illegitimate users. A flexi-
ble access decision is needed because it is hard to predict
and predefine data access policies for any unexpected and
unanticipated events in the real world applications. Current
access control models are not flexible enough to make an
effective access decision at any time. Therefore, we proposed
an adaptive access control model [7] to fill the gap in WSNs
area. The proposed model has a similar structure like BTG
access control model but the main difference is that no human
effort is needed to override rules and policy for unexpected
events because of the introduction of users’ behaviour trust
model, and prevention and detection mechanism.
III. ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Previously, we have proposed an adaptive access control
model [7] to provide a flexible access decision in WSNs. The
proposed model is incorporated the concept of possibility-with-
override [8] into WSN for hard-to-define and unanticipated
situations. Possibility-with-override means users might be able
to override a denial of access, when unexpected events occur.
The proposed model also uses user behaviour monitoring
and trust model to check users’ actions, location, time, etc.
Whenever users try to access data at the sensor nodes, all user
behaviour and user information will be kept by prevention and
detection mechanism as an audit record to detect and prevent
abnormal and unauthorized access. The detailed information of
different modules inside the proposed adaptive access control
model are explained in this section.
There are two main modules in the proposed access control
model: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision
Point (PDP). Whenever a user requests the access to an object,
an access request will go through PEP for the authentication
process and then it will forward a decision request to PDP for
decision making process. PDP makes the access decision on
user request based on defined policy. The decision response
will be forwarded internally to the target. Also, PDP will
forward the decision response to the users, whether they have
the privileges to access data at the sensor nodes or not.
Fig. 1. An Overview of Implementation Framework
The proposed access control model is extended version
of Ponder2 [9] by adding extra module and using additional
information to provide flexibility. The proposed model is de-
signed to make an effective access decision in both normal and
emergency situations. Figure 1 shows the high level overview
design of the proposed access control model. The detailed
information of both PEP and PDP are explained in next sub
section.
A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
In the proposed framework, PEP is used as an authenti-
cation service provider between users and sensor nodes. The
authentication service is an important security provisioning
to provide in the system. Whenever PEP receives an access
request from the user, it will check the user information like
ID and cryptographic key for the authentication purpose. PEP
checks the authenticity of the users, before it forwards the
decision request to PDP. Currently, we assume that authen-
tication service and key distribution are already provided in
PEP. In future, we will work on the implementation of PEP
by using Attribute-Base Encryption (ABE) [5] for data storage.
Also Two-Tier Data Dissemination (TTDD) [10] protocol is
considered to use for data transmission between users and
nodes.
B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
PDP is a main module in the proposed framework. There
are three different modules inside the PDP as shown in
Figure 2. These three modules are; the access control module,
prevention and detection module, and user behaviour trust
module. After PEP forwards the decision request to PDP,
the information such as user, action, environment and context
information will be forwarded to the access control module
and the user behaviour trust module. The user behaviour trust
module will calculate the trust value and forward that value
to the access control module. The access control module will
use the trust value from the user behaviour trust module and
the other information, which is forwarded by PEP, to make
access decisions on the user request. After the access control
module makes a decision, it sends back a response message
to the users and forwards internally to the target object. The
three different modules of PDP are explained as follows.
Fig. 2. Policy Decision Point
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to make an access decision based on access policies
which are predefined in that module. In a normal access
control model, there are two access decisions: permitted and
denied access. If the user has the privileges to get data at the
sensor nodes, his access will be permitted. If the user does
not have rights to access data, his access will be rejected. In
the proposed model, overriding access is introduced to provide
flexibility and make access decisions effectively and efficiently,
when the user needs to access data immediately. The access
control module will only grant the overriding access to the
user, when his trust value is high or trustworthiness enough
to access data. Altogether, three access decisions are used in
the proposed access control module: permitted access, denied
access and overriding access.
In the access control module, there are several predefined
authorization, obligation and overriding policies. In the pro-
posed model, the permitted and denied access will be defined.
By default, everything else is possible to override. The autho-
rization policy will handle for normal permitted and denied
access. The overriding and obligation policy will be used to
make an effective access decision based on user behaviour
trust value in unexpected events. The detailed definition of
these three policies are explained as below.
• Authorization Policy
An authorization policy is used to enforce the ac-
cess control module to check whether a subject is
authorized to execute an action on a target. In the
authorization policy, subject, target, condition and
action are used to define access role. Subject means
a user, who is trying to access data from the target
that stores information. Whenever the access control
module receives a decision request, it will check the
conditions i.e, location and time which are declared in
the specific policy. If the decision request meets the
criteria from a certain policy, the subject is allowed to
do some actions at the target.
• Obligation policy
An obligating policy expects zero or more conditions
to be evaluated and one or more actions to be per-
formed if the conditions are satisfied. One of the
objectives of using an obligation policy is to provide
finer-level access control than mere permitted and
denied decisions. After a policy has been evaluated,
specific obligations are sent along with the authoriza-
tion decision. The obligation policies are used when
the access control module is faced with abnormal user
behaviour or overriding access.
• Overriding Policy
The proposed adaptive access control model intro-
duces an overriding policy based on a user behaviour
trust module. Overriding of access control is one
way to handle such hard-to-define and unanticipated
situations where availability is critical. An overriding
policy is used to support flexibility of access control in
the proposed model. The policy is designed especially
for unpredictable and unexpected situations. Current
access control models cannot make an effective access
decision based on predefined policies and roles, when
an unexpected event occurs. It is hard to predict all
of the access control policies because unpredictable
events can happen at any time. Comparing the pro-
posed model with other access control models, it
provides a flexible approach to make the effective
access decisions.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: The privacy and
confidentiality of data are still provided even in the emergency
case because of the prevention and detection and user be-
haviour trust module. The prevention and detection module is
introduced to prevent abnormal and unauthorized access from
both legitimate and illegitimate users. The main idea is to keep
the information from user access request as an audit record.
The audit record maintains a record of user activities in the
system. An audit record can assist to detect security violations
and flaws in the system.
In the proposed model, an event-oriented log method is
used. The purpose of an event-oriented log is to record an event
and specify when it occurred, the user information associated
with that event and the results of the decision-making process.
The prevention and detection module is used to prevent any
specious access from the users to protect confidentiality and
privacy of data. An audit record will be used by the user
behaviour trust module to predict and calculate the user
behaviour trust value for the user’s next attempt. We will use
ABE based encryption which is already explained under PEP
section, to provide confidentiality and integrity of the audit
data. The TTDD protocol is considered to provide a secure
communication channel for data transmission within BSN and
WSN.
3) User Behaviour Trust Module: In current access con-
trol models, a user with right access privileges can access
data. There is no way to prevent abnormal data access from
the authorized user. The proposed model can be protected
from these kind of situations by using both the prevention
and detection module, and the user behaviour trust module
together. In the proposed model, the users’ behaviour trust
value is calculated and evaluated based on the audit record
from the prevention and detection module. The behaviour
trust value will be forwarded to the access control module
and stored in a database for another evaluation process. The
overall structure of users’ behaviour trust module is shown
in Figure 3. To determine the user behaviour trust value,
Fig. 3. A Framework of User Behaviour Trust Module
the previous, predicted and current value of user behaviour
trust will be used. Current trust value will be calculated and
evaluated based on the user information that is forwarded
by the PEP. The previous trust value is stored in the trust
module. For predicting user behaviour trust value, Naive-Bayes
classification algorithm [11] will be used. The predicting user
behaviour is important and significant in forming a trustworthy
network. For the classification algorithm, the audit record from
the prevention and detection module will be used. There might
be more than two classifiers to predict the user behaviour
trust value. Overall, the behaviour trust value of the user is
calculated based on previous, predicted and current user trust
value.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL
MODEL
The proposed adaptive access control model has been
developed in Ponder2 [9] that is a popular policy language
to use in BSN. Ponder2 comprises a self-contained, stand-
alone, general-purpose object management system with mes-
sage passing between objects. It incorporates an awareness of
events and policies and implements a policy execution frame-
work. It has a high-level configuration and control language
called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed objects are
programmed in Java.
Ponder2 is implemented as Self Managed Cell (SMC) [12]
that is a set of hardware and software components forming
an administrative domain. It is capable of self management.
We assumed SMC as a sensor and try to implement access
control model within the Ponder2. Everything in Ponder2
is a managed object. The managed object has to be loaded
dynamically into the SMC from a library, thereby producing
the factory managed object (Java class). The proposed model is
an extended version of Ponder2 by applying possibility-with-
override concept, user behaviour trust model and prevention,
and detection mechanism together.
We developed the proposed adaptive access control model
based on Ponder2 framework. The interface for all the users
are implemented in Java based on the managed objects in
Ponder2. The Java class file will be loaded dynamically into
SMC. The access control module is already implemented
for the proposed model and defined the policies based on
an application scenario. We designed and implemented the
prevention and detection module in Ponder2. The interface for
the audit log is implemented in Java. The audit log keeps all the
information from user requests, whenever users try to access
patient medical records from any location at any time. The
audit log is stores as “Write.csv” file that will be used by the
user behaviour module to evaluate the trust value of each user.
For the users’ behaviour trust module, a simple calculation is
used and developed. In future, we need to do more work on
the user behaviour trust module.
V. EVALUATION OF ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
In this section, a medical scenario is used to develop the
proposed model for BSNs and WMSNs. The policy specifica-
tion for all scenarios is similar but an access policy for example
medical scenario is discussed in this section. SMC [12] is
represented as a BSN. In this example, each patient has his
own BSN, which consists of several sensors. Sensors sense
and collect information such as glucose level, temperature,
heart rate, etc. We assumed that sensed data are stored as
the medical record in BSN. Users such as doctors and nurses
are trying to access medical record of the patient via mobile,
personal digital assistant or personal computer. For example,
sensors can interact with each other via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless
links and interactions with other mobile phone and personal
digital assistant from users via Wifi or Bluetooth. Each SMC
has its own policy management. Policies are managed by each
SMC specifying which actions can be performed. For doctor
and nurse, context information will be used, when they try to
interact with other SMC or request to join the patient’s BSN
for data access. The following example scenario will show and
express how the proposed access control model is designed and
developed for WSNs.
In an example scenario, users are doctors, nurses, patients,
patient’s family and administrative staff. We assumed that all
the users in this scenario are in a “Hatfield” hospital. All the
users will try to access the medical record of the patient. Based
on their access privileges, the access to the patient medical
record will be different. Therefore, access policies are based on
the users responsibility, their role and context information such
as location and time. A simple scenario of medical application
will be used to express and state the policy clearly.
There are two departments in an example scenario: Heart
and Cancer department. Nurses and patients will be assigned
in one of the department. A doctor can be assigned in the
same department as nurse and patient or he can be assigned
in any other department. The doctor should be a physician of
Heart or Cancer department or General Practitioner (GP) in
“Hatfield” hospital. The doctor and nurse can access patient
medical records with a normal authorization policy when they
are in the same department as the patient. But the nurse and
doctor cannot access the medical record of another patient,
who is not in the same department as they are. Otherwise, there
might be a lack of data privacy for patient’s medical record.
For such a case, the overriding policy is used to override the
denied access in urgent and emergency cases.
Fig. 4. Normal and Overriding Access
The patient’s family might try to access data. They will
have the access to the medical record but some important
information will be hidden because of patient confidentiality
and data security. It is the same for administrative staff. They
can only access patient information like name, department
and other general information, which means that they are not
allowed to request the illness and prescription of the patient.
Therefore, based on the role, responsibility of users and trust
value, the access control model will make an effective access
decision on user requests. Figure 4 explains the overview of
normal and overriding access with an example scenario.
A. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate and test the proposed adaptive access control
model based on an example scenario. In this section user
interface, policies definition of authorization, obligation and
overriding, and audit log interface are explained based on the
example scenario.
1) User Interface: The Interfaces for all the users in an
example scenario have more or less the same feature but the
information from the patient medical record will be changed
based on their roles and access privileges. Consequently, the
access decision will be different for each user. The interface
of the nurse is shown in Figure 5.
In Figure 5, a user needs to give input of the patient path
that includes the name and location of the patient. For example,
Bob is a patient from the Heart department. The path of “Bob”
is expressed as /patient/heart/bob. Aung is a nurse from Cancer
department by looking at his path; /role/nurse/cancer/aung in
above figure. All the trust values for the nurse and doctor are
initialized as 5 that is average trust value. The range of the
trust value is from 0 to 10. The user needs to fill the time
framework, which is between one to twenty-four represented
as twenty-four hours in a day. Time framework can be used
to check time constraint, e.g a nurse can have access to the
patient medical record only at a certain period of time. It is
also part of information that will be used to predict the trust
value of users.
Fig. 5. Interface of A Nurse
Figure 5 also shows the access results of the decision-
making process and medical record of the patient. The first
result shows that, the nurse from Cancer department cannot
access the medical record of the patient from Heart department.
Therefore, his access request has been denied because he
does not meet any criteria from the authorization policy. The
second result shows that if a nurse’s trust value is higher than
average trust value, he can get the patient medical record from
Heart department by overriding his denied access. The access
control module assumes that he is trustworthy to access the
medical record based on previous interaction between other
patients and behaviour trust values. All the permitted, denied
and overriding access of the users are kept as an audit record
that is used to predict trust value of the users.
2) Authorization Policy: Authorization policy is used for
normal permitted and denied access in the proposed model.
For example, a nurse sends the access request to a target.
The access control module will respond to access request
based on the access policy, which is defined in that module
for decision making process. The authorization policy can be
changed based on the requirements of the application. There
might be several authorization policies based on the users’
level and access privileges. An example authorization policy
is expressed as below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject nurse or doctor
action getrecord
target patient from which department
condition location or time
focus target or subject
The above permit-policy defines that who has a right to
access the medical record from a target object. Subject can
only access the target object, when it meets the criteria from
the permit policy such as condition. The authorization policy
can be handled based on predefined policies, apart from that all
the access requests will be denied. For example, the nurse from
the Heart department can access medical record of patients
from the same department.
3) Obligation Policy: Obligation policy is used in some
events to prevent a certain condition. For example, if a nurse
meets the criteria to override access policy, the obligation
policy will be used and sent along with the overriding policy.
Obligation policy is used for triggering an alarm and kept
the audit record for further investigation. For example, if the
nurse’s trust value is less than 5, his access will be denied. At
the same time, the obligation policy will become active and
keep the audit record based on user information and access
request. Additionally, the security alarm will be triggered at
the patient side. The format of obligation policy is shown as
below.
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if policy type is override
or trust value is < 5
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, Behaviour Trust Value, Context
Value >
4) Overriding Policy: The proposed model extends the
Ponder2 by adding an overriding policy. The overriding policy
will check one or more one conditions for decision making
process at the access control module. A user should be a
nurse or a doctor and he can access data from anywhere at
any-time. The nurse or doctor needs to meet at least two
criteria to override the denied policy. The important factor is
the user behaviour trust value which has to be over five to
override the policy. If the trust value is set to zero, the person
is untrustworthy but if it is set to ten, the person is trustworthy.
To override the access policy, the subject have to meet more
than one condition that are described as follow:
Def: Overriding-Policy
subject nurse or doctor
target patient <medical record>
if trust value is > 5
and location = Hatfield
or time is between 8am to 10am
or nurse or doctor is staff
do Set-alarm and Audit-Log
action getrecord
For example, if a nurse wants to override his access policy
in an emergency or urgent case, his user behaviour trust value
has to be more than 5 and at least two of the above conditions
need to be trued.
5) Prevention and Detection Mechanism: The prevention
and detection mechanism keeps all the information from the
user requests as an audit log, whenever users try to access
patient medical records from any location at any time. The
audit log can be seen on Figure 6. In the audit log format,
the subject is a user, who tries to access medical record from
the target. In the audit log, time, user behaviour trust value
and context information such as location are also recorded.
For example from Figure 6, “Doctor Oliver”, who works as a
“Physician” in “Hatfield” hospital, tried to access the medical
record of “Bob” from “Heart” department at “12am” with his
trust value “5” and his access request has been permitted.
Auditlog := [Subject + Time + Target + Trust Value + Context Value]
6) User Behaviour Trust Module: The user behaviour trust
module used all the information from the audit log to evaluate
and calculate the current and predicted user behaviour trust
value. When the application is started, the trust value of all
the users is initialized as five which is an average trust value.
The trust value will be set between zero and ten based on the
trust level of the users. The proposed user behaviour module is
Fig. 6. Audit Log
not finished yet. The overriding policy is tested by giving the
user trust value manually. Currently, the simple calculation is
used for user behaviour trust value. Whenever the user access
request has been permitted, his trust value will be increased by
one. If it is a denied access, his trust value will be decreased by
one. The user behaviour trust value is forwarded to the access
control module. The computation effort of trust model will
be evaluated after it is finished completely. The trust model
needs to be analyzed and implemented carefully to meet the
requirements of WSNs.
B. Summary
Based on the evaluation result with an example medical
scenario, the access control module is cooperated with the
user behaviour trust module, which worked together with
prevention and detection mechanism to evaluate and calculate a
trust value of users, to make an effective access decision. All
policies are predefined in the access control module, which
can adjust its decision based on trust value at any time. Based
on the previous discussion, the overriding policy is useful to
handle unanticipated situations. Therefore, all the modules in
the proposed access model are worked together to make the
effective access decision.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contribution of this paper is to design and
develop an adaptive access control model for medical data in
BSNs and WSNs. In this paper, the interface of the example ap-
plication, the development of possibility-with-override, and the
prevention and detection mechanism are developed in Ponder2.
The proposed model is developed in Ponder2 framework with
additional extensions to adapt the unexpected events by using
privilege overriding and also adjust its decision based on users’
behaviour trust value. All the modules in the proposed access
control are cooperated to make an effective access decision. In
this paper, detailed design, implementation result and policy
testing for the proposed adaptive access control model are
discussed.
Currently, we are working on the user behaviour trust
module. A classification algorithm will be used to predict the
user behaviour trust value. The previous, current and predicted
user trust value are needed to calculate the overall trust value of
the user. It is also important to clean up the data from the audit
log to use it for the classification algorithm. Further research is
needed for how Naive-Bayes and weight metric algorithm can
be applied in the user behaviour trust module. In future, we
plan to implement the proposed adaptive access control model
within the sensor nodes. IRIS version of sensor motes, IRIS
Processor Radio Modules and Lotus motes are considered for
the implementation of the proposed model.
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